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PROLOGUE
[L]aws outlawing discrimination should serve as more than a source of enforceable 
rights and protections; they should also provide a basis for shifting prejudicial 
community attitudes. These only change when a society truly recognises the 
humanity of the group who have been enduring discrimination and, to my mind, 
nothing can be more central to a definition of humanity than respect for the 
importance each of us places upon enduring relationships.2
-A. Nicholson, Honourable Chief 
Justice of the Family Court of 
Australia
In the search for the just Canadian equilibrium it was not expected that majority 
rights and interests would curtsy, endlessly, to minority rights. Neither the framers 
of the Charter nor its most aggressive proponents ever anticipated it serving so 
dominant a societal role. While among their other constitutional duties the courts 
must protect and defend minority interests, that does not endow them with a 
runaway role in the creation and supply of “helpful” legislation to that end.3
-McClung J.A., Honourable Justice 
of the Alberta Court of Appeal
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indebted. I*also wish to thank Martha McCarthy and Joanna Radbord of McMillan Binch, Professor 
Dianne Pothier, Deb LeRose of LEGIT, and Robert Hughes. The author presented sections o f this article 
at a joint meeting of the Canadian Bar Association’s Immigration and Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity sections for Nova Scotia (Halifax, Nova Scotia, February 12, 1999).
2 A. Nicholson, ‘The Changing Concept of Family: The Significance of Recognition and Protection” 
(1997) 6 Australasian Gay and Lesbian Law Journal 13 at 13.
3 Vriend v. Alberta (1996), 37 Alta. L.R. (3d) 364 at 393 (C.A.).
In May o f 1992, the Convention Refugee Determination Division o f the 
Immigration and Refugee Board declared Jacob a convention refugee. He had been 
successful in convincing the Division that i f  he were compelled to return to his native 
Ukraine, he would likely be subjected to various forms o f persecution because he 
was gay. While working at a coffee shop in Toronto, Jacob met Sanjay, a graduate 
student at the University o f Toronto. Jacob and Sanjay began a relationship and, 
as time passed, realized that they wished to commit to each other as life-partners. 
However, their bliss was qualified by the fact that Sanjay soon had to return to India 
to complete his dissertation. As Jacob had attained Canadian citizenship, he was 
optimistic that he would be able to sponsor his life-partner — Sanjay — under the 
"family class immigration ” provisions o f Canada’s Immigration Act. After all, 
Canada had been completely tolerant andprogressive in handling his refugee claim. 
Soon Jacob would realize how wrong he was. He would be thrown into a maelstrom 
o f complex and confusing legal terms, and forced to face a homophobia that was 
more subtle than that which he had experienced in the Ukraine, but no less hurtful
I. INTRODUCTION/ARGUMENT
Section 3(c) of Canada’s Immigration Act states that one of the objectives of 
Canadian immigration law is as follows:
To facilitate the reunion in Canada of Canadian citizens and permanent residents 
with their close relatives from abroad.4
The idealism which underpins this provision has been the source of inspiration for 
same-sex couples where one individual is either a citizen or permanent resident of 
Canada and the other lives abroad, but wishes to be reunited with his/her partner. 
As U.S. immigration policies become more restrictive, an increasing number of 
same-sex couples attempt to utilize the family reunification provisions of our 
immigration law. Indeed, “[s]ince 1992, Canada has been one of seven countries -  
Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden are the 
others -  which provide some level of recognition of same-sex couples for 
immigration purposes.”5
4 R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2.
5 J. Burbidge, “Oh Canada!” (1997), online: Lesbian and Gay Immigration Rights Task Force 
<http://www.eskimo.com/~demian/burbidge.html> (date accessed: 28 October 1998) [hereinafter “Oh 
Canada”].
Despite this seemingly liberal attitude toward same-sex family reunification, the 
central argument of this article is that the exclusion of same-sex relationships from 
the definition of “spouse” in section 2(1) of the Immigration Regulations, 19786 
dispels the illusory progressive nature of Canada’s treatment of same-sex couple 
reunification. Furthermore, this article argues that the aforementioned definition 
violates section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter o f Rights and Freedoms.1 Finally, 
while Canadian immigration law does provide a certain degree of recognition of 
same-sex couple reunification, these provisions amount to “back-door loopholes,” 
encouraged by the Canadian government to prevent “the courts from establishing 
precedents on the rights of.. .same-sex Canadian citizens or permanent residents to 
sponsor their partners for immigration.”8
Part II of this article provides a brief historical overview of the relationship 
between gays and lesbians and Canadian immigration law. Part III orientates the 
reader to the specific provisions in the Regulations which, it is argued, offend the 
Charter, and discusses some of the most salient aspects of a potential Charter 
challenge. Part IV critically explores potential revisions to aspects of the family 
class immigration provisions that affect same-sex couples. Lastly, Part V provides
6 SOR/78-172 [hereinafter Regulations],
1 Part I o f Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter 
Charter].
8 “Frequently Asked Questions on Immigration and Intimate Relationships” ( 1998), online: Smith and 
Hughes Homepage <http://www.smith-hughes.eom/papers/faqs.htm#faq06> (date accessed: 28 October 
1998). In January, 1999, former Immigration Minister Lucienne Robillard announced proposed changes 
to the Regulations which called for the “recognition of common-law and same-sex relationships through 
regulatory changes.” See Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Building on a Strong Foundation for  
the 21“ Century: New Directionsfor Immigration and Refugee Policy and Legislation (Ottawa: Minister 
of Public Works and Government Services, 1998) at 25. This announcement coincided with the massive 
court challenge launched against the federal government by the Foundation for Equal Families, a gay 
and lesbian rights group that is seeking changes to fifty-eight federal statutes that discriminate against 
gays and lesbians. See E. Anderssen, “Ottawa to Enshrine Same-Sex Rights” The Globe and Mail (20 
January 1999) A l. The Charter argument in this article should be perceived, on one hand, as an 
underlying reason why this “recognition” has been proposed. On the other hand, and most importantly, 
the Charter argument should be seen as an essential litigation tool for Canadian gays and lesbians in the 
event that these proposed changes do not become law. It should also be noted that in February, 2000, 
Minister of Justice Anne McLellan introduced an omnibus bill in the House of Commons (The 
Modernization o f  Benefits Act) that proposes to “amend 68 federal statutes to extend benefits and 
obligations to same-sex couples on the same basis as common-law opposite sex couples.” See 
“Government of Canada to Amend Legislation to Modernize Benefits and Obligations,” online: 
Department of Justice o f Canada <http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2000/doc_25019.html> (date 
accessed: 22 March 2000). Although the Bill has passed in the House, and is currently before the 
Senate, if  it becomes law it will not change the Immigration Act.
an overview of how current Canadian immigration law is “conducive” to same-sex 
couple reunification, and attempts to address some of the benefits and detriments of 
these provisions. Thus, this article provides a critical exploration of the legal world 
which Jacob and Sanjay have entered.
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Historically, Canadian immigration law has shared a common denominator with 
other areas of law. It has exemplified the notion that “[t]he heterosexual individual 
and the heterosexual family are the paradigms upon which Canadian law is 
based.. .[and that] Canadian law continues to be based on heterosexist assumptions 
and continues to privilege heterosexuals ahead of lesbians and gay men.”9 Perhaps 
the most glaring example of immigration law’s contribution to legally sanctioned 
homophobia is the 1950-1952 amendments to the Immigration Act:
The new Act really contained three prohibitions. First, homosexuals could not enter 
Canada as visitors. Second, they could not come to Canada as immigrants seeking 
permanent residence. Finally, if a homosexual did enter Canada for any reason,
(s)he was subject to deportation under s. 19(2) if a Special Inquiry Officer found that 
the person in question “practise[d], assisted] in the practice of or share[d] in the 
avails of.. .homosexualism.”10
The catalyst for the exclusion of homosexuals from Canada may be perceived 
as the Canadian government’s appropriation of the American notion that gays are 
security risks (as a means of appeasing U.S. concerns), which blossomed with the 
beginning of the McCarthy era:
In 1952 the explicit exclusion of homosexuals was something to which the Canadian 
Government could refer to show its neighbour that it took seriously its obligations 
in the area of international security. Somewhat on the defensive as the McCarthy 
crusade gathered steam in the early 1950s, Canadian officials tried to maintain an
9 D.G. Casswell, Lesbians, Gay Men, and Canadian Law (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 
1996) at 13. For more on the historical relationship between gays and lesbians and Canadian law, see 
B. Ryder, “Equality Rights and Sexual Orientation: Confronting Heterosexual Family Privilege” ( 1990)
9 Can. J. Fam. L. 39; see also G. Kinsman, The Regulation o f  Desire: Sexuality in Canada (Montreal: 
Black Rose Books, 1987); D. Herman “Are we Family? Lesbian Rights and Women’s Liberation” 
(1990) 28 Osgoode Hall L. J. 789; M. Leopold & W. King, “Compulsory Heterosexuality, Lesbians, and 
the Law: The Case for Constitutional Protection” (1985) 1 C.J.W.L. 163; P. Girard, “Sexual Orientation 
as a Human Rights Issue in Canada, 1969-1985” (1986) 10 Dalhousie L.J. 267.
10 P. Girard, “From Subversion to Liberation: Homosexuals and the Immigration Act 1952-1977” ( 1987)
2 Can. J. o f L. & Society 1 at 11.
independent policy but could not totally ignore American demands for tighter 
security."
The provisipns excluding homosexuals from Canada were not abandoned until July 
25, 1977, with the passage of the Immigration Act, 1976. The 1976 legislation 
incorporated the recommendations of a Special Joint Committee of the Senate and 
the House of Commons, which advocated the amendment of the discriminatory 
provisions, after public consultations in over twenty-one cities and submissions from 
various gay-rights advocacy groups.
in. CHARTER APPLICABILITY
As with many other areas of Canadian jurisprudence, the Charter has had a strong 
impact on how our courts address immigration issues.12 However, with regard to 
spousal sponsorship, there has “[never] been a successful action brought against 
Immigration Canada for violating the Charter rights of gays and lesbians in 
Canada.”13 More precisely, a Canadian court has never heard a section 15 Charter 
challenge of the definition of “spouse” in the Regulations.14 Over a decade ago, 
Deborah McIntosh called for an amendment to the Regulations’ definition of 
“spouse” to facilitate both common-law and same-sex family reunification.15 At the 
same time, she acknowledged that the lack of pertinent Charter jurisprudence at the
11 Ibid. at 17.
12 Professor Donald Casswell identified three primary issues that Canadian courts have explored with 
regard to the relationship between immigration and refugee law and the Charter. The first two issues 
are intertwined, involving both domestic and extra-territorial Charter application. The third addresses 
who is entitled to standing to address concerns involving the potential unconstitutionality o f immigration 
laws. See Casswell, supra note 8 at 562ff. The relevance of these issues to our hypothetical scenario 
is as follows: Jacob, as the potential Canadian sponsor, would be the individual who has standing to 
initiate the Charter challenge, as it would be argued that his section 15 right to equal benefit of the law 
is violated. For a discussion of other issues involving the Charter and immigration law (for example, 
media access and immigration inquiries, the jurisdiction of administrative bodies to engage Charter 
issues, unanimous decisions in refugee claims involving prescribed countries and section IS of the 
Charter), see L. Waldman, Immigration Law and Practice, vol. 1, issue 25 (Toronto: Butterworths, 
1998) at 2.1)-2:82.
13 J.A. Yogis, R.R. Duplak, & J.R. Trainor, Sexual Orientation and Canadian Law (Toronto: Emond 
Montgomery Publications, 1996) at 98.
14 That is not to say, however, that such a challenge has never been contemplated. Part V of this article 
discusses two particular challenges which were initiated, but did not materialize fully, due to the 
responses o f the federal government.
15 D. McIntosh, “Defining ‘Family’ -  A Comment on the Family Reunification Provisions in the 
Immigration Act” (1988) 3 J.L. & Social Pol’y 104.
time would provide considerable hardship to any such attempt at legislative 
change.16 However, since then there has been a progression of Charter 
jurisprudence that would support a section 15 argument against the definition of 
“spouse.” Nevertheless, the status of the Regulations has not changed. Therefore, 
this article will now examine some of the most salient aspects of such a hypothetical 
Charter challenge.17
A) Section 15(1) Analysis
1) Legal Principles
Section 15(1) of the Charter states,
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, 
without discrimination based on race, natural or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, 
age or mental or physical disability.18
The definition of “spouse” in the Regulations is of the utmost significance for the 
following reason: in order to facilitate the family reunification objective of the 
Immigration Act, individuals who meet specific requirements which qualify them as 
“sponsors” (discussed later in this article) may sponsor the landing application of 
someone who fits in the definition of the “family class.” As per section 2 of the 
Regulations, such an individual includes the sponsor’s spouse. The position of this 
article is that the section 2(1) definition of the Regulations offends section 15(1) of 
the Charter in providing,
“spouse,” with respect to any person, means the party of the opposite sex to whom 
that person is joined in marriage.19
i6Ibid. at 110-111.
17 It could also be argued that the definition of “spouse” in the Regulations stands in violation o f the 
Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6. However, such an argument will not be the focus of 
this article.
18 Part I of Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
19 SOR/78-172. In addition to same-sex couples, the definition of “spouse” in the Regulations also 
excludes common-law couples. While this is an extremely important and contentious issue, it will not 
be the focus of this article.
A leading Supreme Court of Canada determination on section 15 is Vriend v. 
Alberta,20 which involved the omission of sexual orientation as a prohibited ground 
of discrimination in the Alberta provincial human rights legislation. In Vriend, Cory 
J. was adamant about the importance of section 15(1):
The rights enshrined in s. 15(1) of the Charter are fundamental to Canada. They 
reflect the fondest dreams, the highest hopes and finest aspirations of Canadian 
society.. .Canada by the broad scope and fundamental fairness of the provisions of 
s. 15(1) has taken a further step in the recognition of the fundamental importance 
and the innate dignity of the individual. That it has done so is not only praiseworthy 
but essential to achieving the magnificent goal of equal dignity for all.21
As with Vriend, a challenge to the definition of “spouse” in the Regulations 
would not involve a “government actor” debate,22 as the challenge would involve 
regulations made pursuant to federal legislation. Thus, the next relevant issue is the 
substance of a section 15(1) analysis. In Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General)? La Forest J., delivering the unanimous reasons of the Supreme Court of 
Canada, noted that the Court has adopted a varying approach to section 15(1). 
However, he went on to assert that despite this, there has been a general agreement 
on the basic analytic framework.24 In Miron v. Trudel, McLachlin J. summarized 
this analytic framework — first enunciated in the case of Andrews v. Law Society o f  
British Columbia25— as follows:
The analysis under s. 15(1) involves two steps. First, the claimant must show a 
denial of “equal protection” or “equal benefit” of the law, as compared with some 
other person. Second, the claimant must show that the denial constitutes 
discrimination. At this second stage, in order for discrimination to be made out, the 
claimant must show that the denial rests on one of the grounds enumerated in s.
20 [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 [hereinafter Vriend].
21 Ibid. at 535.
22 Section 32( lXa) o f the Charter stipulates that the application of the legislation extends to “the 
Parliament and government of Canada in respect o f all matters within the authority of Parliament.”
23 [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624. This case involved a claim that the British Columbia government violated 
section 15 by not providing funding for sign language interpreters for deaf patients who received 
medical services.
24 Ibid. at 669.
25 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 [hereinafter Andrews],
15(1) or an analogous ground and that the unequal treatment is based on the 
stereotypical application of presumed group or personal characteristics.26
The recent Supreme Court of Canada case of Law v. Canada27 further elaborated 
on what exactly constitutes discrimination. As per Law, after establishing that there 
is differential treatment between the claimant and others, and that this differential 
treatment is based on an enumerated or analogous ground, the following question 
must be asked:
Does the differential treatment discriminate, by imposing a burden upon or 
withholding a benefit from the claimant in a manner which reflects the stereotypical 
application of presumed group or personal characteristics, or which otherwise has 
the effect of perpetuating or promoting the view that the individual is less capable 
or worthy of recognition or value as a human being or as a member of Canadian 
society, equally deserving of concern, respect, and consideration?28
2) Application o f Section 15(1) to the Regulations:
In the Ontario Court of Appeal case of Rosenberg v. Canada,29 the claimant, 
Rosenberg, had lived with a female partner for over ten years. She was an employee 
of the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE), which had a pension plan 
stipulating that the spouses o f plan members were eligible to receive survivor 
benefits. After amending the definition of “spouse” in its plan to include same-sex 
partners, CUPE asked Revenue Canada to register the amendment in order to obtain 
tax deferral advantages. Revenue Canada, however, rejected the amendment 
because it was not in harmony with the definition of “spouse” in the Federal Income 
Tax Act, which excluded same-sex couples. The Attorney General in Rosenberg 
conceded that the definition of “spouse” violated section 15(1) of the Charter, and 
concentrated its arguments on the section 1 inquiry. Eventually, the Court 
unanimously held that the definition of “spouse” in the Income Tax Act (with regard 
to registered pension plans) must include same-sex couples.
26 [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418 at 485 [hereinafter Miron],
27 [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 [hereinafter Low].
28 Ibid. at 549.
29 ( 1998), 38 O.R. (3d) 577 [hereinafter Rosenberg], The Attorney General decided not to seek leave 
to the Supreme Court of Canada to appeal this decision. See J. Ditchbum, “Government Muddled Over 
Approach to Gay Rights” Canadian Press Wire Service (23 June 1998), online: QL (CPN).
Similarly, the definition of “spouse” in the Regulations runs afoul of section 
15(1). The Regulations establish a distinction between potential gay or lesbian 
claimants and others, which is based on a personal characteristic. Specifically, a 
dichotomy exists between individuals in same-sex relationships (and heterosexual 
common-law relationships) and individuals in married heterosexual relationships. 
This distinction denies the claimant equal benefit of the law as, unlike a married 
heterosexual individual, he/she would be unable to sponsor his/her partner under the 
definition of “spouse” in section 2(1) of the Regulations.
With respect to the second element of the section 15(1) analysis, the 
discrimination aspect of the test would be met, as the relevant distinction would be 
made on the basis of sexual orientation which, as held by the majority of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Egan v. Canada, is an analogous ground under section 
15(1).30 Also, the distinction imposes a burden/disadvantage which is not imposed 
on others, and is based upon the stereotypical application of presumed group 
characteristics:
The definition of “spouse” as someone of the opposite sex reinforces the stereotype 
that homosexuals cannot and do not form lasting, caring, mutually supportive 
relationships with economic interdependence in the same manner as heterosexual 
couples...The discriminatory impact can hardly be deemed to be trivial when the 
legislation reinforces prejudicial attitudes based on such faulty stereotypes. The 
effect of the impugned provision is clearly contrary to s. 15’s aim of protecting 
human dignity, and therefore the distinction amounts to discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation.31
In Law, Iacobucci J. provided an exhaustive list of four “ contextual factors 
which [help] determine whether legislation has the effect of demeaning a claimant’s 
dignity” and thus discriminating.32 This article argues that, as was the case in M. v. 
//.,33 all four factors militate towards a finding of discrimination in Jacob and 
Sanjay’s situation.
30 [ 1995] 2 StC'.R. 513 [hereinafter Egan). For a discussion of whether such challenges should be made 
on the ground o f sexual orientation or family status, see R. Wintemute, “Sexual Orientation 
Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: Same-Sex Couples and the Charter in Mossop, Egan and 
Layland' (1994) 39 McGill L.J. 429 at 436.
31 Egan, ibid. at 604.
32 Law, supra note 26 at 534-541.
33 [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter M. v. //.].
First, with respect to gays and lesbians, a pre-existing disadvantage, 
stereotyping, prejudice, and vulnerability clearly exists. The definition of “spouse” 
in the Regulations exacerbates these circumstances. Second, Iacobucci J. stated in 
Law that “the mere fact that the impugned legislation takes into account the 
claimant’s traits or circumstances will not necessarily be sufficient to defeat a s. 
15(1) claim.”34 However, in this case, the Regulations do nothing to take Jacob’s 
situation into account. They simply exclude him from the ability to sponsor Sanjay. 
Third, as stated in M. v. H., “the existence of an ameliorative purpose or effect may 
help to establish that human dignity is not violated where the person or group that 
is excluded is more advantaged with respect to circumstances addressed by the 
legislation.”35 While there is an ameliorative purpose involved — family 
reunification— gays and lesbians are in no way more advantaged than heterosexuals. 
They are clearly at a huge disadvantage. Lastly, the interest affected by the 
definition of “spouse” in the Regulations is fundamental. By denying Canadian gays 
and lesbians the ability to sponsor, and thus be reunited with their partners, the 
federal government has deprived them of a “basic aspect of full membership in 
Canadian society” and has implemented “a complete non-recognition of [this] 
group.”36
B) Section 1 Analysis:
1) Legal Principles
Section 1 of the Charter states,
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms 
set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.37
Hence, if Jacob, our claimant, can establish a section 15(1) infringement, the burden 
would then shift to the government/proponent o f the Regulations to establish, on a 
balance of probabilities, that the infringement is justified under section 1 o f the
34 Law, supra note 26 at 551.
35 M  v. //., supra note 32 at 56.
36 Law, supra note 26 at 540.
37 Part 1 of Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
Charter. The analytic framework for a section 1 analysis was first set out in R. v. 
Oakes,38 and recently restated in Vriend:
A limitation to a constitutional guarantee will be sustained once two conditions are 
met. First, the objective of the legislation must be pressing and substantial. Second, 
the means chosen to attain this legislative end must be reasonable and demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society. In order to satisfy the second requirement, 
three criteria must be satisfied: (1 ) the rights violation must be rationally connected 
to the aim of the legislation; (2) the impugned provision must minimally impair the 
Charter guarantee; and (3) there must be a proportionality between the effect of the 
measure and its objective, so that the attainment of the legislative goal is not 
outweighed by the abridgment of the right.39
2) Application o f Section 1 to the Régulations
2(a) Pressine and Substantial Objective
This article argues that the “pressing and substantial objective” aspect of the test in 
Oakes is the most important component of the hypothetical section 1 analysis of the 
definition of “spouse” in the Regulations of the Immigration Act. Thus, this aspect 
will be given primary consideration.40
As noted by Justice Abella in Rosenberg, section 1 jurisprudence has been less 
than illuminating with respect to “whether the analytical fulcrum in s. 1 was the 
objective of the statute or section, or whether it was the objective of the specific 
infringing limitation within that statute or section.”41 As further noted by Justice 
Abella, early section 1 decisions rendered by the Supreme Court of Canada (for 
example in Oakes and Andrews) appear to stand for the proposition that it is not the 
overall legislative objective that is to be considered, but rather the objective of the
38 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 [hereinafter Oakes],
39 Vriend, supra note 19 at 554. For comprehensive academic analysis of section 1, see P.W. Hogg, 
“Section 1 Revisited” (1992) 1. N.J.C.L. 1 ; E.P. Mendes, “In Search o f a Theory of Social Justice; The 
Supreme Court Reconceives the Oakes Test” ( 1990) 24 R.J.T. 1 ; N. Siebrasse, “The Oakes Test: An Old 
Ghost Impeding Bold New Initiatives” (1991) 23 Ottawa L. Rev. 99; S.R. Peck, “An Analytical 
Framework for the Application of the Canadian Charter o f Rights and Freedoms" ( 1987) 25 Osgoode 
Hall L.J. 1.
40 Although it is rare for courts to hold that this aspect of the Oakes test has not been met, exceptions do 
exist. See R. v . Big MDrug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 [hereinafter Big M]; Somerville v. Canada 
(Attorney General) (1996), 184 A.R. 241 (C.A.); Vriend, supra note 19.
41 Rosenberg, supra note 28 at 583 [emphasis added].
specific impugning provision.42 However, as argued by Professor Dianne Pothier, 
in both Egan and Miron, the Court incorrectly moved away from this approach. In 
doing so, it incorrectly favoured broad legislative objectives, which were 
“completely independent ofthe primafacie violation. ”43 The difficulty with framing 
the objective at such a high level of generality is obvious:
Starting with the objective of the legislation overall lowers the burden on the 
government in the second part of the Oakes test, where it is obliged to demonstrate 
that the means chosen to meet that objective are reasonable and proportional. It is 
easier to justify the reasonableness of the means used when measured against a 
broad, generally desirable social policy objective. This, in turn, makes equality 
infringements easier to justify as subordinate to a more generalized and pressing 
social interest.44
Hence, if the objective considered is solely that of the Immigration Act, Jacob’s 
potential claim would be severely thwarted. However, such a characterization would 
be directly contrary to the clarity provided by Iacobucci J. in the Vriend decision. 
Speaking for a unanimous bench on this issue, Iacobucci J. advanced the principle 
that the pressing and substantial aspect of the Oakes test does not focus on the 
objective of the statute or section, but rather “the analysis must focus upon the 
objective of the impugned limitation.”45 This statement does not mean, however, 
that the objective of the limitation should be considered in isolation.46 As stated by 
Justice Abella in Rosenberg,
42 Ibid.
43 D. Pothier, “M’Aider, Mayday: Section 15 of the Charter in Distress” (1996) 6 N.J.C.L. 295 at 312 
[emphasis in original]. As noted in M.A. McCarthy & J.L. Radbord, “Family Law for Same Sex 
Couples: Chart(er)ing the Course” (1998) 15:2 Can. J. Fam. L. at 101, see footnote 187,
The [section 15] cases that have been lost have all failed because Courts have identified 
general laudatory objectives o f the legislation (laudatory from the Court’s view at least -  
privileging heterosexual family units is the most common) and then found that those 
objectives meet the proportionality test. This amounts to circular reasoning unless the Court 
also considers how the laudatory purpose is furthered by the exclusion of the group and the 
purpose of the exclusion itself. The rationality of the Oakes test depends entirely on the 
articulation of the objective.
44 Rosenberg, supra note 28 at 584 [emphasis added].
45 Vriend, supra note 19 at 555.
46 Ibid.
This is not to say that the purpose of the legislation, or of the particular section in 
that legislation containing the impugned provision, is irrelevant, but their relevance 
is limited to providing a context rather than a focus for the Oakes analysis.47
In attempting to articulate the objectives of family class immigration, and the 
Immigration Act (in order to provide such a context), section 3(c) of the Act is worth 
citing again. As per this section, one of the objectives of our immigration law is
to facilitate the reunion in Canada of citizens and permanent residents with their 
close relatives from abroad.48
This objective is brought to fruition by allowing those who meet particular 
sponsorship criteria to sponsor the landing application of relatives who fall within 
the “family class.” Hence, the relevant questions could be constructed as follows: 
what is the objective of excluding individuals in same-sex relationships from the 
definition of “spouse,” so as to prevent Canadians from sponsoring their partners for 
landing under the family class immigration provisions? Is this objective “pressing 
and substantial” within the broader context of reuniting family members? To 
address these questions properly, it is integral to explore the essence of what 
constitutes “family.”
2(a)(i) The Objective with Resard to “Family ”
Examining the definition of “spouse” in the Regulations in light of the concept of 
family, the definition advances the position that only legally married heterosexual 
couples fit within the realm of the family class. Similarly, in both Miron and Egan, 
Gonthier J. and La Forest J. situated their analyses in terminology of biological and 
social realities, and the allegedly inherent heterosexual nature of marriage,
47 Rosenberg, supra note 28 at 584. This idea was supported by Iaccubucci J. in Vriend, supra note 19 
at 555.
48 R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2. In 1986, the importance o f this objective was clearly stated by the Standing 
Committee on Labour, Employment and Immigration: “Family reunification has been, and will continue 
to be, the cornerstone of Canada’s immigration policy. The Committee believes that family reunification 
is the most important and sensitive aspect of our policy and should continue to be so.” See House of 
Commons, “Minutes o f Proceedings and Evidence o f the Standing Committee on Labour, Employment 
and Immigration, Respecting Order o f Reference Relating to Family Class Immigration”, 1 “session, 33rd 
Parliament 1984-86, Issue No. 68 (11 June 1986) at 6 [hereinafter House of Commons]. It should also 
be noted that family class immigrants do not have to meet the “points system” selection criteria that 
independent immigrants do. See D. Galloway, Immigration Law (Concord, Ont.: Irwin Law, 1997) at 
142. The nature o f this system is elaborated on in Part V.
procreation, and child nurturing.49 The ideologies which form the foundation of the 
exclusion of same-sex individuals from the definition of “spouse” and support the 
positions of the aforementioned Justices are both dangerous and disturbing. Such 
ideologies accept traditional values without questioning the oppressive context in 
which these values were shaped.50 They passively accept “the superiority of the 
heterosexual, married family unit.”51 Rather, if the notion of family is perceived not 
as a “natural group,” but as a social construct, then the propensity to overemphasize 
the traditional meaning of family is qualified. To give credence to a particular 
paradigm of “family” neglects that culture “is not a static, unchanging, identifiable 
body of information... [but] a series of constantly contested and negotiated social 
practices.”52 Hence, as the culture of our society is a living, breathing entity, varying 
family forms will be catalyzed by its constant change. A recognition of these 
varying forms leads to an analysis of the notion of family at a more functional level.
Perhaps the most resounding judicial endorsement of the evolving nature of 
families and the need for a functional analysis, is the dissenting judgment of 
L'Heureux-Dubé J. in Canada (A.G.) v. Mossop:
Single-parent families, especially mother-led, are prevalent; an increasing number 
of parents never marry; divorce is common, as is remarriage; significant numbers of 
families are comprised of a husband and wife with no children at home; lesbians and 
homosexuals establish long-term and committed relationships...The state focuses on 
the family as an organizing structure of society... If there is value in encouraging 
individuals to form stable and emotionally intimate relationships, such relationships 
can be forged and maintained in a wide variety of family forms...It is the social 
utility of families that we must recognize, not any one proper form that “the family” 
must assume; it is the responsibility and community that family creates that is its 
most important social function and its social value.53
In harmony with L'Heureux-Dubé J. ’s remarks, it can be said (as was said before the 
Supreme Court of Canada by counsel for M., in M. v. H.) that there is a false
49 M. A. McCarthy & J.L. Radbord, "Foundations for 15(1)" (1999) 6 Michigan Journal o f Gender and 
Law 261 at 352.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 A. Rao, “The Politics o f Gender and Culture in International Human Rights Discourse” in J. Peters
& A. Wolper, eds., Women's Rights, Human Rights: International Feminist Perspectives (New York: 
Routledge, 1995) at 172-173.
53 [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554, at 627-628, 629ff.
dichotomy between the monolithic notion of the heterosexual family and the gay and 
lesbian “Other:”
Expert evidence shows that lesbians and gay men form long-term relationships, 
which involve emotional support, loyalty, love and affection, economic sacrifices, 
and an expectation of permanence. Many rear children together. As occurs in 
heterosexual couples, cohabitation in an intimate relationship with a view to 
spending a lifetime together naturally leads to...cooperation, compromise, and 
sharing.54
Therefore, the objective behind excluding gays and lesbians from the definition 
of “spouse” is that these relationships do not constitute traditional familial 
relationships. Thus, they should be excluded from family class immigration 
provisions to ensure that these provisions are only beneficial to that which the 
federal government considers “family.” However, claimants such as Jacob could 
advance a more functional and progressive conceptualization of “family.” If 
accepted, this definition would leave the objective far from pressing and substantial. 
With this conceptualization, it appears the only real purpose of the exclusion is to 
discriminate against gays and lesbians.55 As per cases such as Vriend and BigM, an 
objective under section 1 of the Charter cannot be based on discrimination.56
2(a)(ii) Possible Economic Objectives
Setting the objective of excluding same-sex relationships solely within the context 
of family reunification may be misleading, and not indicative of the higher level of 
complexity that a section 1 analysis could involve. Specifically, section 3(h) of the 
Immigration Act states that a further objective of immigration law is
54 Respondent M.’s Factum on Appeal and Cross-Appeal, in the Supreme Court of Canada, Appeal from 
the Court of Appeal for the Province of Ontario at 12-13 [unpublished] [hereinafter Respondent M.’s 
Factum]. This passage could be interpreted as promoting a “sameness” argument, which further points 
to the complexity of this issue: “there are those who would argue...that the ‘family’ model is itself 
conservative, and exclusionary. By adopting the qualities perceived to be held by the idealized 
heterosexual family, lesbians and gay men simply reinforce and affirm this idealization.” See D. 
Herman, Rights o f  Passage: Struggles for Lesbian & Gay Legal Equality (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1994) at 146.
55 In M. v. H., counsel for M. also argued that the objective o f the exclusion was nothing more than to 
discriminate. Respondent M.’s Factum, ibid. at 35.
56 Vriend, supra note 19; Big M, supra note 39.
To foster the development of a strong and viable economy and the prosperity of all 
regions in Canada.57
As opposed to the altruistic objective of reuniting families, “[a] more compelling 
case can be made that the commitment to ‘family’ in immigration law is in truth 
ancillary to the dominant economic objectives of the Act.”58 As stated in the 
Minister of Manpower and Immigration’s 1966 White Paper on Immigration,
To remain of positive value.. .immigration policy must be consistent with national 
economic policy in general and with national manpower and social policies in 
particular...[T]here is unlikely to be general support for any immigration policy 
which appears... to ignore the economic and social facts of life.59
The relevant question for our section 1 analysis becomes pecuniary: what are the 
dominant economic objectives of the legislation/family class immigration 
provisions? Furthermore, how do these objectives relate to the exclusion of 
individuals in same-sex relationships from the definition of “spouse” in the 
Regulations?
First, instead of reuniting those in intimate relationships, the provisions are more 
concerned with reuniting “economic units of production.” Related to this notion is 
the idea that the admission of spouses under the umbrella of family class 
immigration is conducive to economic prosperity because it facilitates “social 
reproduction.” That is to say, “the admission o f ‘family’ plays an important part in 
immigration policy by providing a privatized support system which enables 
immigrants to engage in sustained economic activity.”60 The exclusion in our
57 R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2.
58 J.C. Hathaway, “Towards a Contextualized System of Family Class Immigration” in J.C. Hathaway, 
Report o f  the National Consultation on Family Class Immigration (June 1994) at 6 [hereinafter 
‘Towards a Contextualized System”].
59 Ibid. As recognized by Professor Hathway at 7, discussion of the economic objectives which underlie 
family class immigration policies “has been largely absent from policy debate.” Instead, he submits, 
there has been a general idealization of the humanitarian underpinnings. In contrast, see B. Cheadle, 
“Proposed Overhaul Would Toughen Immigration Policy” Canadian Press Wire Service (6 January 
1998), online: QL(CPN):
Canada should dramatically change immigration policy to more aggressively promote national 
economic self-interest, says a report released Tuesday by Immigration Minister Lucienne 
Robillard...The report opens with a swipe at political correctness which it says has stifled 
debate on immigration policy.
60 Ibid. at 7.
hypothetical analysis would not have a pressing and substantial objective in the 
context of the social reproduction for two reasons. To begin, it is premised upon the 
traditional notion of the nuclear family, with a husband at the helm. In such a 
structure “employers and/or the state benefit from the assignment to the dependent 
wife of (unremunerated) responsibility for most activities related to social 
reproduction.”61 A reconceptualized understanding of what constitutes a family may 
expose the objective of the exclusion as purely discriminatory. Second, and perhaps 
in the alternative, if a court accepts the broader objective to establish a support 
system based on dependency,62 it can be argued that although social reproduction in 
same-sex relationships may not materialize in the same manner as in certain 
heterosexual relationships, social reproduction does exist. As stated by Professor 
Hathaway,
Social reproduction within these new forms of family (and indeed within the 
changing “traditional family”) may not result from the classic dependency-induced 
attribution of full responsibility to the wife, but is more typically achieved bv the 
pooling of resources and responsibilities within a relationship of interdependency.63
Therefore, the objective of exclusion is not pressing and substantial when related to 
the broader objective of social reproduction.
A further possible objective of the legislation/family class immigration 
provisions, which also fits within an economic context, is the reunion of families
61 Ibid. For a discussion o f the relationship between this ideology and society’s attitudes towards 
homosexuality, see J. Keller, “On Becoming a Fag” (1994) 58 Sask. L. Rev. 191. At 197, Keller 
observes,
It was no coincidence that society’s heightened concern about and the state’s increased 
legislation on homosexual activity occurred during the rise o f industrialization and 
urbanization. With industrialization, the family changed from a productive force to a 
reproductive force...With reproduction now at the centre of the family, monogamy was 
preached as the ‘proper’ form of relationship, partly because o f religious beliefs, but also 
because it was the easiest way to keep women in the home and under control...social roles 
became more clearly defined, and as sexuality was more closely harnessed ideologically to 
the reproduction o f the population so the social condemnation of homosexuality increased 
[emphasis added].
62 In 1986, the Standing Committee on Labour, Employment and Immigration was in favour of policies 
that encouraged immigration on the basis of “actual dependency.” See House of Commons, supra note
47 at 14.
63 “Towards a Contextualized System,” supra note 57 at 9-10 [emphasis added]. This is not to suggest, 
however, that no same-sex relationships structure themselves according to a homemaker/bread winner 
paradigm. As with opposite-sex relationships, gay and lesbian relationships exhibit a great deal of 
diversity, which further points to the complexity o f this issue.
while avoiding the imposition of costs on the state. This objective is manifested in 
the “undertaking requirement” that accompanies an application to sponsor a family 
class member. Specifically, if an individual meets the “sponsor” definition in 
section 2 of the Regulations, and the requirements set out in section 5(2),64 he/she 
is authorized to sponsor a family class landing application. One o f these 
requirements is that the potential sponsor must give an undertaking, defined in 
section 2 of the Regulations as,
an undertaking in writing given to the Minister by a person to provide for the 
essential needs of the member of the family class and the member’s dependents for 
a period of 10 years and to ensure that the member and the member’s dependents are 
not dependent on any payment of a prescribed nature referred to in Schedule VI.65
In making reference to Schedule VI, the Regulations essentially require the sponsor 
to ensure that the sponsoree does not make any claims under various social 
assistance statutes.
Hence, if the broader objective is family reunification with the assignment of 
costs to the sponsor (not the state), the government could submit that the objective 
of excluding individuals in same-sex relationships from the definition of “spouse” 
is pressing and substantial because sponsors often do not comply with their 
obligations:
Public confidence in the administration of the family class immigration program has 
been shaken by the realization that taxpayers have been required to bear the cost of 
support for a significant number of sponsored family members. This is decidedly 
not the logic of the program... In practice, the sponsorship agreement system is in 
tatters. While a reasonable estimate is that 12,000 or so new social welfare claims
64 For example, he/she must be a Canadian citizen or permanent resident who is at least nineteen years 
old, and (with certain exceptions) must be resident in Canada from the time of the application until the 
sponsoree is granted landing: SOR/78-172.
65 SOR/78-172. The hypocrisy of the Regulations with regard to the definition of the term spouse is 
striking. For example, as previously noted, individuals in heterosexual common-law relationships are 
excluded from the definition when it pertains to who constitutes a member of the family class. However, 
with regard to undertakings/who is responsible for sponsorship obligations, as per section 5(1) (in 
conjunction with section 5(2X0), if  the heterosexual common-law partner of a sponsor co-signs a 
sponsorship undertaking with regard to a potential family class immigrant, then the common-law partner 
is also responsible. In other words, in such a situation, the definition of “spouse” does extend to 
heterosexual common-law relationships.
are made each year by sponsored relatives, almost none of the assistance funds paid 
out are recoverable from sponsors.66
In other words, the government could advance the position that since the objective 
o f not allocating costs to the state has not been fulfilled, it is a pressing and 
substantial objective not to increase family class immigration (often the most 
prevalent form of immigration to Canada).67 The government may achieve this 
objective by excluding people in same-sex relationships from the definition of 
“spouse.” This position is fallacious for four reasons. First, the exclusion was 
present before problems with the sponsorship system materialized. Second, why are 
gay and lesbian relationships singled out for exclusion to meet this objective? A 
possible response is that they are singled out to alleviate the problem because they 
are already excluded. However, this rationale begs the question of why they are 
excluded. While the government could assert that it has also considered making it 
harder to sponsor parents as landed immigrants, this is of no consequence, as these 
ideas were never implemented.68 Third, the Supreme Court of Canada has 
disapproved of phrasing the objective in terms of saving money.69 The fourth 
problem with this potential government argument will be addressed in the following 
section.
66 J.C. Hathaway, “Implementation of a Contextualized System of Family Class Immigration,” supra 
note 56 at 14-16 [emphasis in original] [hereinafter “Implementation of a Contextualized System”].
67 ‘Towards a Contextualized System,” supra note 57 at 2.
68 “Immigration-Rules,” Canadian Press Wire Service (18 November 1993), online: QL (CPN).
69 Singh v. Canada (Minister o f Employment and Immigration), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 at 218-219. While 
this discussion of potential pressing and substantial objective arguments pertains to the exclusion of 
individuals in same-sex relationships from the definition of “spouse,” a potential objective is also the 
exclusion of common-law relationships. Specifically, in immigration matters there is an incentive to 
“fake” spousal relationships, which does not exist in other areas. Hence, the government could argue 
that excluding individuals in common-law relationships by requiring legal proof o f a relationship makes 
such deceptions more difficult. Furthermore, it could be argued that this is pressing and substantial 
within the broader context o f only reuniting “legitimate” or “genuine” families. This is not an infallible 
argument, as the existence o f a technically legal marriage does not necessarily mean there is a 
relationship that would be considered “genuine.” As recognized in section 4(3) of the Regulations, the 
family class does not include spouses who are technically married to Canadian sponsors, if the marriage 
can be considered a “marriage of convenience”: SOR/78-172. As set out in Horbas v. Canada (Minister 
o f Employment and Immigration), [1985] 2 F.C. 359 (T.D.), a marriage of convenience exists if  the 
sponsored spouse only entered into the marriage so that he/she could immigrate to Canada, and if he/she 
did not have an intention to permanently reside with the sponsoring spouse.
2(b) Reasonable and Demonstrably Justified
If the government objective is pressing and substantial under section 1 of the 
Charter, the means chosen to reach this objective must be reasonable and 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. This assessment involves 
elements of rational connection, minimal impairment, and proportionality. Part III 
has identified some of the most salient aspects of a hypothetical Charter challenge, 
which, it is argued, fall under both the section 15(1) analysis, and most importantly, 
the pressing and substantial component of the section 1 analysis. However, some 
key aspects of the reasonable and demonstrably justified component will now be 
briefly outlined, and should be taken into consideration when contemplating such 
a hypothetical challenge.
With regard to the failure of the sponsorship regime, the concept of rational 
connection must be considered. Specifically, if the government objective were 
pressing and substantial, it would not logically follow that restricting same-sex 
couples from the family class immigration provisions would help to minimize costs 
to the state. Thus, no rational connection exists between the objective of family 
reunification while minimizing state costs and the exclusion of gays and lesbians in 
same-sex .relationships. For example, it is unlikely that the government could 
demonstrate that sponsors in same-sex relationships have defaulted on their 
sponsorship support obligations to family class members (such as parents and 
grandparents) more than others. If this could be shown, it does not necessarily 
follow that individuals in same-sex relationships would also shirk support 
obligations owed to their partners. Furthermore, instead of the present exclusion, a 
restructuring of the sponsorship system would achieve the objective more 
appropriately. In other words, to reach the objective of family class immigration 
without financial loss to the state, it would seem rational to fix the system, rather 
than implementing a discriminatory practice to prevent further fiscal loss to the 
government. Admittedly, this is not easily done -  potential remedies such as more 
rigorous investigation of the sponsor’s ability to meet an undertaking, more rigorous 
enforcement against sponsors on default, requiring the sponsor to pay a performance 
bond, and granting conditional admission to the sponsoree, all have inherent 
difficulties. However, one potential remedy might be to utilize more effectively 
section 108(2) of the Immigration Act, which provides for federal-provincial 
government agreements with respect to immigration policies:
The jurisdictional concerns said to stymie regular litigation by provinces to recover
social welfare payments to sponsorees from their sponsors in accordance with their
undertaking could be easily resolved by the routine assignment of sponsorship 
undertakings by the federal government to the province of reception.70
Two additional points should be made. First, in further reference to the notion 
of rational connection, if the broader government objective were to be characterized 
as promoting only traditional family reunification, excluding same-sex non- 
traditional families is not a means that is rationally connected to the particular goal. 
In other words, allowing same-sex spousal reunification in no way affects or 
discourages traditional family reunification. Second, denying Jacob the chance to 
be legally reunified with his partner does not minimally impair his section 15(1) 
right to equal benefit of the law without discrimination. Rather, it is a maximum 
impairment of his right.
In concluding this Charter analysis, it should be noted that much of the Supreme 
Court of Canada section 15 jurisprudence involves comparator groups of either 
common-law, opposite-sex and married heterosexual couples, or same-sex and 
common-law couples. These cases can be seen as establishing the building blocks 
for a finding of discrimination in cases such as this one, where the comparator 
groups are same-sex and married couples.
In Miron, the Court held that it was unconstitutional to distinguish between 
common-law and married opposite-sex spouses in the payment of automobile 
insurance benefits. The Court found that reserving such benefits for legally married 
spouses violated section 15(1), and that the definition of “spouse” in the Ontario 
Standard Automobile Policy should be extended to include common-law opposite- 
sex couples. In M. v. H., the comparator groups were same-sex and common-law 
opposite-sex couples. Section 29 of Ontario’s Family Law Act extended spousal 
support rights to the latter group, but not the former. The Court held “that the 
human dignity of individuals in same-sex relationships [was] violated by the 
impugned legislation,”71 and thus that there was a section 15(1) violation which was 
not saved by section 1.
70 J.C. Hathaway, “Report of the National Consultation on the Immigration of Family Members,” supra 
note 56 at 6 [hereinafter “Report of the National Consultation"]. For a further examination o f possible 
changes to the sponsorship provisions, see H.D. Greenberg, ed., “Family Sponsorship: Proposed 
Amendments to Immigration Regulations, 1978” (1996) 33 Imm. L. R. (2nd) 12.
71 M. v. H., supra note 32 at 58.
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that it violates section 15(1) 
to distinguish between both common-law and married opposite-sex couples, and 
same-sex and common-law opposite-sex couples, in a discriminatory way. This 
leads to the logical conclusion that the discriminatory distinction between same-sex 
and married couples in the Regulations also violates section 15(1). Furthermore, it 
can be argued that confining the definition of “spouse” to those in legally married 
relationships amounts to adverse effects discrimination against gays and lesbians, 
who are denied the right to marry. Gays and lesbians are served a double blow — 
they can only sponsor their partners if they are married, and yet they have no ability 
to get legally married.
This examination of the most crucial aspects of a section 15 and section 1 
Charter analysis, demonstrates that the exclusion in question is unconstitutional. 
Hence, it appears as though one of the objectives of Canadian immigration law is 
also neglected. Namely, as stated in section 3(f) of the Immigration Act, the goal
to ensure that any person who seeks admission to Canada on either a permanent or 
temporary basis is subject to standards of admission that do not discriminate in a 
manner inconsistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.12
TV. POTENTIAL REVISIONS/REMEDIES
To reiterate, section 2 of the Regulations defines “spouse” as follows:
the party of the opposite sex to whom that person is joined in marriage.73
With regard to the establishment of an appropriate constitutional remedy, it appears 
that of the choices set out in the leading remedy case of Schachter v. Canada, 
“reading in” would be most appropriate.74
For example, in the same-sex adoption case of Re K., Ontario’s Child and Family 
Services Act permitted joint adoption applications by spouses.75 However, the 
legislation used the definition of “spouse” in the provincial Human Rights Code, 
which defined “spouse” as
72 R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2.
73 SOR/78-172.
74 [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679.
75 (1995), 23 O.R. (3d) 670 (Ontario Court o f Justice, Provincial Division).
the person to whom a person of the opposite sex is married or with whom the person 
is living in a conjugal relationship outside marriage.76
The Court found this definition unconstitutional, and “read in” the words “of the 
same or opposite sex” after the words “with whom the person.” Similarly, a court 
could use the “reading in” remedy so that the definition of “spouse” in the 
Regulations becomes “the party of the opposite sex to whom that person is joined 
in marriage or of the same or opposite sex with whom the person is in a conjugal 
relationship outside marriage.”
However, ideally the legislature will take responsibility, and step-in to rectify the 
problem. The recent Immigration Legislative Review report recommended to 
former Citizenship and Immigration Minister Lucienne Robillard that the term 
“spouse” be redefined to include “a partner in an intimate relationship, including 
cohabitation of at least one year in duration, with the burden of proof resting on the 
applicant in either case.”77 In addition to the ambiguity surrounding what constitutes 
an “intimate relationship,” some have argued that the one year cohabitation 
requirement is also troublesome. While acknowledging the desire to have some sort 
of objective criteria, non-governmental organizations such as the Lesbian and Gay 
Immigration Task Force (LEGIT) and Equality for Gays and Lesbians Everywhere 
(EGALE), have noted that the requirement may exclude many legitimate same-sex 
relationships. As pointed out by EGALE in its March 1998 response to the 
Immigration Legislative Review report,
In some countries, due to prohibitions on same-sex relationships, social taboos, or 
homophobia, cohabitation is not a realistic option for same-sex couples yet the 
relationship may still be genuine.. .if implemented, the cohabitation requirement will 
benefit mostly same-sex couples from northern western nations where restrictions 
on same-sex cohabitation are less severe... [Also, f]or many of these couples, the one 
year cohabitation requirement is simply not an option because they are citizens of 
different countries and are not likely to be able to remain temporarily in their 
partner’s country for one year.78
76 Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, s. 10.
77 Immigration Legislative Review, Not Just Numbers: A Canadian Framework for Future Immigration 
(Ottawa: Minister o f Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997) at 44 [hereinafter Not Just 
Numbers].
78 “EGALE Brief to Immigration Legislative Review Ministerial Consultations,” online: EGALE 
Homepage <http://www.egale.ca/~egale/politics/immigrat.htm> (date accessed: 16 October 1998).
EGALE suggests that if the cohabitation requirement is implemented, a broad/ 
expansive judicial interpretation should be applied, which would be in harmony with 
certain family law interpretations of the term “cohabit.” However, ideally the group 
suggests that the term cohabit be abandoned in favour of the words “maintaining a 
spousal relationship.”79 Professor Hathaway agrees that instead of creating a new 
sponsorship category for same-sex couples, a more straightforward answer would 
be to amend the existing definition. In general, while Hathaway does not discount 
the possible merits o f a cohabitation requirement, if same-sex couples cannot meet 
this requirement, he suggests that the sponsor and sponsoree should be able to 
establish that they are both “emotionally and economically interdependent.”80
This article argues that the cohabitation requirement is not overly problematic. 
In the spousal support case of Molodowich v. Pettinen,i] the Court recognized the 
similar nature of the terms “cohabit” and “conjugal,” and expressed the generally 
accepted features of these terms. For example, shared shelter, sexual and personal 
behaviour, services, social activities, societal perceptions, economic support, and 
children.82 Although shared living arrangements were included in the Court’s 
characterization, as stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in M. v. H., Molodowich 
“recognized that these elements may be present in varying degrees and not all are 
necessary/’83 Thus, it seems that Professor Hathaway’s suggestion of “emotional 
and economic interdependency” is not an alternative to cohabitation, but rather an 
element of it.
To determine what immigration officers should look for with respect to evidence 
of cohabitation as manifested by emotional and economic interdependency, it is 
useful to consider other jurisdictions which have provisions for same-sex family 
class immigration. For example, the Australia “Procedures Advice Manual” lists 
factors such as “public recognition o f an ongoing domestic relationship...each 
spouse’s knowledge of the other’s personal circumstances and background...the 
existence of shared responsibilities within the family unit... [and] sharing of income,
79 Ibid.
80 “Report o f the National Consultation,” supra note 69 at 4-5.
81 (1980), 17 R.F.L. (2d) 376 (Ont. Dist. Ct.) [hereinafter Molodowich],
82 Ibid. at 380-382.
83 M. v. //., supra note 32 at 50-51.
financial assets and liabilities.”84 Similarly, in New Zealand, authorities are 
instructed to consider a number of factors:
[P]hotos of the couple, letters between the couple, proof of shared accommodation 
(e.g. joint mortgages or joint tenancy agreement or rent book), proof of shared 
income (e.g. bank statements showing any transfer of funds from one partner’s 
account to the other’s), proof of shared bank accounts (e.g. statement or bank books 
showing joint accounts are held), and any evidence of public or family recognition 
of the relationship (e.g. letters addressed to the couple).85
Admittedly, for such a definition to work, immigration officers would be required 
to take a holistic approach to the relationships evaluated. Hence, further education 
and training would be required: “[i]mmigration officers are not psychologists or 
anthropologists, yet in a sense the rules require them to act these parts.”86
V. AVOIDING THE SPOUSE DEFINITION
Despite the restrictive definition of “spouse” in the Regulations, in certain ways 
Canadian immigration law is conducive to same-sex couple reunification. This 
article will now explore options available to Sanjay and Jacob outside of a section 
15(1) Charter challenge.
A) Reunification Options
1. Immigration as an Independent
The Immigration Manual is clear that neither individuals involved in same-sex or 
common-law relationships are included within the definition of spouse. However, 
it suggests that individuals in these types of relationships can be considered as 
independent immigrants.87 As Sanjay would not likely fit within the sphere of the 
Business Immigration Program, he could apply under the “skilled worker” 
provisions of the independent immigrant class.88 After obtaining an application form 
from a Canadian consulate or embassy, Sanjay would soon be evaluated under the 
“points system,” “according to which points are allocated to the applicant under a
84 “Implementation of a Contextualized System,” supra note 65 at 7-8 [emphasis in original].
85 Ibid. at 8.
86 Ibid. at 9.
87 Immigration Manual, OP-1, “General Procedural Guidelines” at 4.2.2.
88 Generally, independent immigration is governed by sections 8-11 and Schedule 1 of the Regulations.
variety of headings with a view to identifying his or her capacity to become 
successfully established in Canada.”89
2. Humanitarian and Compassionate Considerations
The Immigration Manual advises that in a same-sex sponsorship situation, “where 
compassionate or humanitarian considerations exist, the partner should submit an 
independent application directly to the appropriate visa office.”90 The manual 
further states, “[humanitarian and compassionate grounds exist when unusual, 
undeserved or disproportionate hardship would be caused to the person seeking 
consideration if he or she had to leave Canada.”91
3. Residual Discretion
Section 11 (3) of the Regulations entitles a visa officer to issue a visa to an individual 
who does not receive the required 70 points, if “in his opinion, there are good 
reasons why the number of units of assessment awarded do not reflect the chances 
of the particular immigrant and his dependants of becoming successfully established 
in Canada.”92
B) Analysis
In 1994, the Immigration Department issued a telex to Canadian consulates and 
embassies explicitly instructing all visa officers to process same-sex family class 
immigration applications within the framework of one or more of the three 
mentioned “options.”93 Within one year of the issuance of the telex, an estimated 
sixty-two gay and lesbian Canadians were reunited with their partners under one of
89 Galloway, supra note 47 at 153. As per Schedule 1 o f the Regulations, the headings under which the 
applicant is assessed are as follows: education, education and training, experience, occupational factors, 
arranged employment or designated occupation, a demographic factor, age, knowledge of English and 
French, and personal suitability. See SOR/78-172. Each heading carries a maximum number of points 
that can be awarded, and the applicant is required to reach at least 70 points.
90 Immigration Manual, IP-1, Processing Undertakings in Canada at 3.3.
91 Immigration Manual, IE-9, at 9.07. The manual also cites factors such as “family dependency” as 
examples o f what would fall under humanitarian and compassionate grounds.
92 SOR/78-172.
93 For a reproduction of this telex, see “Processing of Same Sex and Common Law Cases,” online: 
LEGIT Homepage <http://www.ncf.carleton.ca/ip/social.services/legit/immigrate.faq> (date accessed:
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the three provisions.94 While this article concedes that this allowance of same-sex 
couple reunification is positive, it argues that the government’s objectives in 
promoting these options were far from altruistic. Specifically, in encouraging visa 
officers to use these three alternatives, the government has essentially provided itself 
with a mechanism to avoid the launching of a potentially successful Charter 
challenge, “thus avoiding the possibility o f ‘adverse’ Charter jurisprudence."95
This argument is exemplified by two particular case scenarios. In Part III it was 
mentioned that, to date, a section 15 Charter challenge to the definition of “spouse” 
in the Regulations has not been heard by a Canadian court. However, that is not to 
say that such a challenge has never been contemplated. In January of 1992, 
Christine Morrissey (the current Co-Chair of LEGIT) commenced proceedings for 
such a section 15 challenge in the Federal Court of Canada. As a remedy, Morrissey 
requested that the Court either interpret the definition of “spouse” to include gay and 
lesbian partners, or read gay and lesbian partners into the Regulations. Morrissey, 
who had Canadian citizenship, applied to sponsor her partner of fourteen years, 
Bridget Coll. Coll had joint Irish and U.S. citizenship. Before Morrissey’s 
application, Coll had been informed by the Immigration Department that she did not 
meet the necessary criteria of an independent immigrant. Subsequent to this 
decision, the Department refused to process Morrissey’s sponsorship application.96 
However, after Morrissey commenced a section 15 challenge Coll’s situation 
changed:
a lawyer for the Department of Justice asked that Bridget apply for permanent 
residency to have an application to accompany Christine’s sponsorship application, 
suggesting that this was simply for formal purposes connected with the lawsuit. But 
much more was underway. The application was handled personally by the Canadian 
Consul General in Seattle. Bridget, the former rejectee, was given permanent 
residency. Even the standard interview was waived. Canada was prepared to buy 
off this challenge to the status q u o .97
In a second case, Andrea Underwood, a Canadian citizen, applied in 1991 to 
sponsor her partner Anna Carrot. Carrot was a British citizen who was in Canada,
94 Casswell, supra note 8 at 572.
95 Ibid. at 564.
*  Ibid. at 569.
97 LEGIT, “Taking the Next Step: A Brief to the Honourable Sergio Marchi, Minister of Immigration” 
(12 November 1993) [unpublished] [emphasis added] [hereinafter LEGIT],
and had been living with Underwood for approximately eight years. The 
government responded to Underwood’s application by issuing a deportation order 
against Carrot in 1992.98 Underwood and Carrot then commenced a section 15 
challenge to the definition of “spouse” in the Federal Court. In LEGIT’s 1993 brief 
to then Immigration Minister Sergio Marchi, it stated, “[f]or some reason the system 
was not prepared to buy off this second challenge.”99 However, LEGIT was wrong 
-  the government eventually did “buy o ff’ this challenge. Although the initial 
refused application requested that humanitarian and compassionate grounds be 
considered, after the Federal Court proceeding was commenced “the Department of 
Im m igration  agreed to process C arro t[’s ]...lan d ed  im m igrant 
application...favourably on humanitarian and compassionate grounds.”100
These two cases demonstrate the tribulations that same-sex couples undergo to 
have their applications recognized. Furthermore, they show the commitment of the 
federal government to sidestepping the constitutionality of the definition of “spouse” 
in the Regulations. In an interview that I conducted with Christine Morrissey’s 
lawyer, Robert Hughes, he stated that the government’s “back door approach to 
same-sex relationships” is insulting, commenting further that “[m]any people are 
unaware that it is even possible for same-sex partners to receive consideration on the 
basis of the relationship because of the lack of information provided by Citizenship 
and Immigration.”101
The options available to same-sex couples, to avoid the restrictive definition of 
“spouse,” are also problematic because they are highly discretionary: “in 
immigration, there is no such thing as ‘can’t.’ It is all ‘won’t.’ There are so many 
exceptions, and powers to except, that there are no hard and fast rules.”102 For 
example, the section 11(3) residual discretion provision of the Regulations is a 
double-edged sword, as it permits visa officers to deny visas to potential immigrants 
who meet the 70 point threshold. Such a denial will occur if the total points are not 
indicative of the applicant’s potential of successfully establishing him/herself in
98 Casswell, supra note 8 at 570.
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Canada.103 However, the notion of discretion goes far beyond what is legislated, and 
often extends into the realm of arbitrariness:
Canada now allows the immigration of same-sex partners, but under the worst 
possible set of procedures. There are no rules. There are no appeals. There are no 
rights. There is no assurance of consistency of decision making by the program 
managers and visa officers in the various embassies and consulates. There is no 
openness, no transparency, no publicity. If someone goes into an embassy or 
consulate in Paris or Atlanta are they likely to get accurate information about the 
possibilities of a Canadian sponsoring their lesbian or gay partner? Or will they get 
a standard form document which indicates that they do not qualify for family class 
sponsorship; a document which explains nothing about what can occur on 
“humanitarian” grounds.104
This type of difficulty led Robert Hughes, in one case, to advise his clients to file 
their application through the Canadian embassy in South Africa because “the Visa 
Manager who had originally drafted the 1994 telex on humanitarian and 
compassionate grounds was based in Pretoria. The hope was that this office would 
view a linked same-sex couple’s application in the best possible light.”105 Certainly 
such situations do not come close to meeting the Immigration Legislative Review 
report’s assertion that “transparency, fairness and equality of treatment... must be 
enshrined in law.”106 The fundamental importance of immigration or visa officers’ 
decisions should not be minimized, as courts are not keen on reversing such an 
officer’s use of discretion. As stated by the Federal Court of Appeal in Shah v. 
Minister o f Employment and Immigration, the standard for being granted judicial 
review with regard to decisions concerning humanitarian and compassionate relief 
is not low: “the applicant must show that the decision-maker erred in law, proceeded 
on some wrong or improper principle or acted in bad faith."107
103 SOR/78-172. It can be argued that the Supreme Court of Canada’s affirmation of the Federal Court, 
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Lastly, not being included in the definition of “spouse,” but being admitted 
under one of the three “alternative options,” could potentially be beneficial to those 
in same-sex relationships. Specifically, the partner who already resides in Canada 
would not be required to commit to the sponsorship obligations that he/she would 
be obliged to adhere to under the family class immigration provisions. Admittedly, 
a sponsor’s obligation (under section 5(2)(f) of the Regulations) to establish that 
his/her income is above the “low income cut-off’ is often waived under particular 
criteria set-out in section 6(3) of the Regulations.108 However, this exception does 
not absolve the sponsor from his/her other obligations. Thus, for example, under the 
three alternative options the partner already in Canada would not have to file an 
undertaking to be financially responsible for his/her partner109 or be excluded from 
reuniting with his/her partner because of bankruptcy.110 Whether these potential 
benefits would be of much importance to a same-sex couple is debatable, largely 
depending on the couple’s particular set of circumstances.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Though Jacob and Sanjay are fictional, composite characters, the legal dilemma that 
they face is by no means uncommon. Certainly this article has not meant to paint 
a bleak picture for Canadian gays and lesbians who wish to be reunited with their 
partners. As noted, options for same-sex family class immigration in Canada do 
exist and may even carry particular advantages. In fact, the very existence of such 
provisions puts Canada within an elite class of nations.111
There is, however, no logical reason to settle for a system that is not equitable 
and just. The benefits extended to same-sex couples with respect to family class 
immigration should by no means obscure the detriments. This article has not 
attempted to conduct a fully comprehensive and nuanced section 15(1) Charter 
challenge to the definition of the term “spouse” in the Immigration Regulations. 
However, it has identified some of the most salient aspects of such a challenge, and 
has concluding that it is perfectly reasonable to expect a Canadian court to find the
108 SOR/78-172.
109 SOR/78-172, section 5(2Xb).
1,0 SOR/78-172, section 5(2Xe).
111 For an overview of same-sex family reunification policies in Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden, see J.D. Wilets, “International Human Rights Law and Sexual 
Orientation” (1994) 18 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 1 at 104-105.
definition in question unconstitutional. Whether such a challenge is actually 
litigated is an entirely different matter. As shown by the cases of Christine 
Morrissey and Andrea Underwood, the government has gone out of its way to avoid 
having the issue heard in court. Instead of guaranteeing gays and lesbians their 
constitutional right, the government has opted for a highly discretionary, inconsistent 
system which is insulting, as it “process[es] lesbians and gays through the back door 
instead of recognizing [them] openly as members of the family class.”112
Perhaps one of the most disheartening aspects of the federal government’s 
refusal to recognize gays and lesbians as family class members, is that this refusal 
exists in a time when various Canadian laws are changing to reflect the reality of 
same-sex relationships:
Several provinces have already begun to amend their legislation. Since 1997, 
British Columbia has amended numerous statutes, including six core statutes, to add 
same-sex couples. In June 1999, Quebec amended 28 statutes and 11 regulations to 
grant same-sex couples the same benefits and obligations that are available to 
opposite-sex common-law couples. And in October 1999, to comply with the 
Supreme Court decision in M v. //., Ontario passed omnibus legislation to bring 67 
statutes into compliance with the ruling.113
In light of these arguments, the federal government should definitively act to change 
the definition of “spouse” in the Regulations of the Immigration Act, to avoid an 
inevitable judicial declaration of the definition’s unconstitutionality. Most 
importantly, the government must fully recognize the value and impQrtance of all 
close human relationships involving both economic and emotional interdependency.
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